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Objectives: Research has shown that effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and severity of
illness each play a role in drug reimbursement decisions. However, the role of budget
impact in such decisions is less obvious. Policy makers almost always demand a budget
impact estimate yet seem reluctant to formally include budget impact as a rationing
criterion. Health economists even reject budget impact as a legitimate criterion. For these
reasons, it is important to examine its use in rationing decisions, and rationales underlying
its use.
Methods: We trace several rationales supporting the use of budget impact through a
literature review, supplemented by semistructured interviews with eleven key stakeholders
involved in drug reimbursement decisions in the Netherlands.
Results: Budget impact arguments are used in certain instances, although policy makers
appear uncomfortable with its use because well described rationales still are lacking. In
addition, we identify the following rationales to support budget impact as a rationing
criterion: opportunity costs, loss aversion, uncertainty and equal opportunity.
Conclusions: Budget impact plays a role in drug reimbursement decisions and has
rationales to support its use. However, policy makers do not easily admit that they
consider budget impact and are even reluctant to explicitly use budget impact as a formal
criterion. A debate would strengthen the theoretical foundation of budget impact as a
legitimate criterion in the context of drug reimbursement decisions. Such discussion of
budget impact’s role will also enhance policy-makers’ accountability.
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It is acknowledged that effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and
severity of illness play or should play a role in drug re-
imbursement decisions (9;13;39;43). Less consensus can be
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found for the role of budget impact as an additional decision
criterion. Especially health economists argue that the bud-
get impact argument undermines cost-effective allocations,
and therefore leads to suboptimal distributions of health in
the populations (32;40;42). Nevertheless, given increasingly
stringent budget constraints, policy makers have a need to
know what the impact of any new technology will be on
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their limited budget. Budget impact analyses provide such
information (25;27;30). Budget impact refers to “the total
costs that drug reimbursement and use entail with respect to
one part of the health care system, pharmaceutical care, or
the entire health care system, taking into account the possi-
ble reallocation of resources across budgets or sectors of the
health care system” (10). If on the basis of cost-effectiveness
information a positive reimbursement decision is suggested,
budget impact addresses the question of what amount of re-
sources would be needed to implement the decision. For re-
imbursement purposes, several national health technology as-
sessment agencies, including the Healthcare Insurance Board
in the Netherlands (CVZ) and the Pharmaceutical Benefits
Advisory Committee (PBAC) in Australia, already require
that drug manufacturers submit both cost-effectiveness and
budget impact analyses of newly approved pharmaceuticals
(27).
Advocates of the budget impact criterion point out that
cost-effectiveness analyses fail to meet the needs of policy
makers, whose overriding concern is not so much the cost-
effectiveness of the interventions, but their budget constrains
(40). Cost-effectiveness analysis does not address affordabil-
ity. This is especially a problem when resource requirements
for the funding of new technologies are relatively large. The
precise role of budget impact and its rationale in drug re-
imbursement decisions have not been made clear in the lit-
erature. Whereas a small number of studies have addressed
descriptions of methods for conducting budget impact anal-
ysis (25;26;34;40), the literature on drug reimbursement de-
cisions is still dominated by formal cost-effectiveness and
severity of illness-analyses. This may be due to the fact that
budget impact is not perceived as a legitimate decision cri-
terion as it lacks scientific rigor; meaning rational use of
evidence based, and explicit knowledge (4). In this study, we
outline current policy practices in which budget impact plays
a role in drug reimbursement decisions. Next, we provide a
synopsis of results gathered from interviews with eleven key
stakeholders involved in drug reimbursement decisions in the
Netherlands. Subsequently, we examine possible rationales
underlying the use of budget impact as a decision criterion
for resource allocation. In so doing, we hope to provide more
explicit knowledge for the use of the budget impact as an
argument for allocation in health care.
METHOD
Our initial examination of the role of budget impact as a deci-
sion criterion consisted of a literature search in PubMed cov-
ering the period 1990–2007. Instead of using Mesh or Emtree
terms, we used more specific (combinations of) keywords;
“budget(ary) impact,” “affordability,” “drug reimbursement
and budget impact /affordability,” and “drug reimbursement
and rationing / prioritization.” In addition, we used a snow-
ball method to generate references starting with the milestone
articles by Trueman et al. (40) and Mauskopf (25). We sup-
Table 1. Background of Interview Respondents
Organization Employment n
Ministry of Health Policy associate drugs and
medical technology
2
Healthcare insurance board
(CVZ)
Policy associate benefit
package decisions
2
CEO 1
Dutch organization for
innovative drugs (Nefarma)a
Policy associate drug
reimbursement
2
UMC St Radboud,
Department of
Epidemiology, Biostatistics
and Health technology
assessment
Health economist /
scientific researcher
1
Canisius-Wilhelmina Hospital CEO 1
The NVZ Dutch Hospitals
Association
Policy advisor health care 1
Erasmus MC, Institute of
Health Policy and
Management
Professor in “Societal
aspects of hospital drug
policy” and also a hospital
pharmacist
1
aAn umbrella organization for the Dutch innovative pharmaceutical
industry.
Table 2. Topic List Semistructured Interviews
• How do you define budget impact?
• What is the relevance of budget impact as a criterion in
drug reimbursement decision making?
• When is budget impact used as a decision criterion?
• In what decision process (e.g., budget re-allocation,
admission to the benefit package, etc.)?
• When is budget impact used in the drug
reimbursement decision-making process?
• Is budget impact’s use formally acknowledged?
(Are there official reports on budget impact similar to
cost-effectiveness and severity of illness?)
• Is budget impact mere addition to cost-effectiveness infor-
mation or can it trump cost-effectiveness and severity
of illness arguments too?
• Can you name specific drug types (e.g., orphan drugs,
drugs for lifestyle conditions) for which budget impact is
most likely to play a role?
• Do you know of specific cases in which budget impact
played an important role?
• What motives or argumentations are there to use budget
impact as a decision criterion in resource allocation?
• Have you used budget impact analyses to guide your
decisions?
• If yes, what was your motivation to do so?
plemented the literature review by conducting semistructured
interviews with eleven key stakeholders involved in drug re-
imbursement decisions in the Netherlands (see Tables 1 and
2). The interviewees were selected on the basis of their in-
volvement in reimbursement decisions of pharmaceuticals
in which budget impact had been a major discussion point.
The interviews were recorded and converted to transcripts,
which have been hand coded to analyze the content of the
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interviews. The codes were discussed among the researchers
(code words were, e.g., budget impact/costs, cost-
effectiveness, objective/scientific rationing, uncertainty, op-
portunity costs, and equality) (19).
Current Practice
Use of budget impact is very much a reality in current health-
care decision making; policy makers use budget impact as a
decision criterion in certain instances. Results from a multi-
nomial modeling of NICE decision making, for example,
showed that interventions with a high budget impact were
more likely to be recommended for conditional reimburse-
ment and use, that is, with restrictions, holding clinical- and
cost-effectiveness, as well as other considerations constant.
The model showed that “[t]he potential budget impact [. . .]
was significantly higher for those interventions that were
recommended for restricted use than those recommended for
routine use,” without restrictions (12).
In the Netherlands, it appears budget impact also played
a significant role in a number of drug reimbursement deci-
sions (31). An example is the reimbursement decision for
clopidogrel, trastuzumab, and the entire class of statins. In
1999, CVZ advised the Ministry of Health to admit clopido-
grel for all approved indications to the health benefit package
on the grounds of its favorable clinical- and cost-effectiveness
profiles. However, because of its relatively high cost com-
pared with existing therapy (acetylsalicylic acid) combined
with the potential for substantial off-label use, CVZ rec-
ommended severe restrictions on clopidogrel’s use. Despite
CVZ’s recommendations, the Ministry of Health decided
not to reimburse clopidogrel at all, citing budget limitations
(15;32;42). Subsequent to the Ministry’s decision, a suc-
cessful legal challenge by the drug manufacture obliged the
Ministry to reimburse clopidogrel for all approved indica-
tions. Nevertheless, the Ministry has not reimbursed new
indications for clopidogrel, and continues to place severe re-
strictions on its reimbursement and use, appealing again to
high budget impact due to the potential for substantial off-
label use in a large patient population (2;15). The Ministry
expressed similar concerns about reimbursement of statins
(31). The large pool of potential users of statins suggests that
a positive reimbursement decision would exert significant
upward pressure on pharmacy expenditures. This reasoning
led to the Ministry’s decision to place conditions on the re-
imbursement of statins (23).
Although reimbursement of statins for specific sub-
populations may be explained by stratified cost-effectiveness
analyses (across sub-populations), Niezen et al. (31) show
that strictly prescribing in accordance with the conditions of
reimbursement imposed on statins entails under-treatment,
according to the (evidence based) professional guidelines.
This example demonstrates that budget impact likely played a
role. A third example, the in-patient cancer drug trastuzumab
(breast cancer), is generally seen as cost-effective. The drug’s
budget impact is high, owing to its relative high price per
patient and the relatively high volume of breast cancer pa-
tients who would be considered eligible for its use. Recent
research demonstrates that trastuzumab was unevenly dis-
tributed among patients in The Netherlands (7). Although
hospitals received additional funding for trastuzumab, the
cost of the drug grew much faster than the assigned budget,
causing great pressure on the hospital pharmaceutical budget
(33). Evidently, unequal access was caused in part by the
“intolerably” high impact unrestricted reimbursement has on
the local budget of certain hospitals.
Interviews
Most interviewed policy makers confirmed that budget im-
pact did play a role in certain specific cases, such as clopido-
grel and sildenafil. Budget impact becomes a more important
factor when the uncertainty regarding other criteria, such as
cost-effectiveness and severity of illness is high. However, the
interviewed policy makers could not explain how the bud-
get impact criterion precisely interacts with effectiveness,
cost-effectiveness, and severity of illness. The respondents
confirmed that budget impact played a role, but that its role
was intuitive or based on a “gut feeling” (Respondent VIII,
2006). The most common reply was that “it depends on the
other case specific factors.” Moreover, policy makers did not
provide a concrete definition of what is meant by budget
impact and what budget impact analyses specifically assess.
I do not know the term budget impact very well, thus my understand-
ing of it would depend on the context in which I encountered it, and
not as part of my understanding of health economics. (Respondent
X, 2006)
The lack of clarity surrounding budget impact does not appear
to hamper its use.
The higher the budget impact, the more therapeutic value there must
be and efficiency determines the outcome, just because the effect on
the budget is bigger. As uncertainty [regarding an intervention’s
effectiveness] increases, one could choose to be more reserved in
deciding to fund. Nevertheless, patients’ interests and therapeutic
value are the focus of interest, also for the Minister [of Health].
Only, the Minister is also responsible for not exceeding growth
targets and thus will be more critical. (Respondent IX, 2006)
Policy makers have little incentive for formally discussing
their concerns regarding the impact of reimbursement deci-
sions on the (pharmacy) budget. Because reasonable argu-
ments supporting the use of budget impact are lacking or not
(yet) formulated, policy makers typically concentrate on us-
ing arguments of effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and sever-
ity of illness. Thus, policy makers rely on and interpret the
available scientific, technical, and clinical data contained in
evidence-based “cost-effectiveness analyses” or “health tech-
nology assessments.” Such analyses offer them the supposed
promise of a rational grasp of, and concomitant “control”
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over, healthcare decision making (4;5). Consequently, policy
makers often rely only on information gathered from cost-
effectiveness analyses to justify their decisions, instead of
explaining how budget impact had an effect on the decision.
Because we really think it is important to maintain efficacy and
therapeutic value, because yes. . . that forms the core of the decisions
that we make. So that cost or what you call budget impact, that is
at the bottom of the list. (Respondent VIII, 2006)
Actually, we do not like the cost discussion. Because, indeed, in the
case of clopidogrel, yes, we are not going to formally acknowledge
it [cost or budget impact led to the decision]. And in the case of
sildenafil, well, it felt more normal; you could explain more easily
that we do not pay for erection disorders and that type of stuff. Yet,
clopidogrel is sometimes a life-saving medication, although it is
only so for one in a hundred users. But you do not want to go into
a cost discussion. (Respondent VIII, 2006)
The citations above show how uncomfortable policy makers
are with formally acknowledging that budget impact plays
a role in reimbursement decisions. Implicitly, budget impact
already seems to have a place in priority setting, although
explicitly budget impact seldom is used as an argument for
denying a drug reimbursement outright or imposing con-
ditions on its reimbursement, given that it appears to lack
scientific rigor or a rationale.
Rationales in Favor of the Budget Impact
Criterion
Although the respondents did not give explicit rationales
for budget impact, literature does show some rationales that
justify budget impact’s use as a rationing criterion. These
rationales comprise the opportunity costs of reimburse-
ment decisions, the fact each decision involves gains and
losses that are evaluated differently, uncertainty and equal
opportunity.
Opportunity Costs. One of the main arguments
found in the literature in favor of using budget impact anal-
yses, is a deficiency in common cost-effectiveness analyses;
opportunity costs are disregarded (6;10;18;22;35;36;38). Ex-
pansion of the benefit package will typically be considered
when a drug has a favorable incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio (ICER), suggesting that incremental health gains
are worth the incremental costs. Most recently developed
drugs, though, have positive cost-effectiveness ratios. Con-
sequently, a positive reimbursement decision for a new in-
tervention suggests the need to expand the budget for health
care or some of the existing benefits in the benefit package
would have to be eliminated to fund the new intervention.
Whichever solution one chooses, there is an opportunity cost
involved that must be considered. The opportunity cost of a
positive reimbursement decision increases with the size of a
drug’s budget impact. One will have to sacrifice increasing
amounts—less to spend on other public programs, or exist-
ing health benefits—to fund the new drug. The higher the
opportunity cost, the more one has to sacrifice, the less likely
it will be for a drug to be reimbursed.
Moreover, the opportunity cost argument necessitates a
re-evaluation of the justification of the value of the incre-
mental ICER thresholds and their use in decision making
(17;36;38). Healthcare payers operating within a constrained
budget may deny reimbursement of new medical technolo-
gies with a high budget impact because funding these in-
terventions would lower the lambda (λ), or threshold ICER,
which is equal to the ICER of the last program selected
for reimbursement before the budget is exhausted. In other
words, λ reflects the opportunity cost of marginal health-
care resources, or benefits foregone of the last unit of health-
care resources spent (6;17;18;35). A lower λ could mean
that other pharmaceuticals already in the benefits package
would no longer meet the threshold. However, because not
all cost-effectiveness ratios of treatments included in the cur-
rent benefit package are known, neither is λ known. Accord-
ingly, Gafni and Birch (17) suggest that policy makers require
actual information on the opportunity costs of marginal re-
sources. A possible approach to priority setting combining
information on (opportunity) costs, cost-effectiveness and
health related benefits of drugs is program budgeting and
marginal analysis (PBMA). “PBMA addresses allocative ef-
ficiency by providing a systematic framework for maximiz-
ing health related benefits for a given budget considering
both the outcomes from, and costs of providing, a range of
services” (16).
Loss Aversion; Endowment Effects. Policy mak-
ers may be more reluctant to exclude drugs from the collec-
tively funded benefits package than to include them. A shared
feeling among policy makers we interviewed is that taking
something away from patients that works and with which
they are already familiar outweighs the benefit of adding
something new. This rationale is closely tied to opportunity
costs. However in this case, it directly concerns what happens
when a treatment is eliminated from the benefit package. It
reflects the people’s tendency to prefer avoiding losses to
acquiring gains. Budget impact makes it possible to con-
sider the actual felt loss, the endowment effect, in rationing
decisions. The higher the budget impact, the more one has
to sacrifice, the more loss is felt by health insurance payers
and patients and less likely the decision is accepted. To il-
lustrate, a person who loses $100 will lose more satisfaction
than another person will gain satisfaction from a $100 wind-
fall. In turn, there is a discrepancy between an individual’s
maximum willingness to pay for a good and the minimum
compensation demanded to give up the good. There are sev-
eral explanations for this phenomenon, described by Dupont
and Lee (14) including the “endowment effect” which cap-
tures the overvaluation of a good that is in already in one’s
possession; the “status quo bias” which describes the pref-
erence to remain in a current state; and “prospect theory”
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where losses impact the agent’s utility more than gains of
the same magnitude (14;24). The inherent difficulty of hav-
ing to exclude treatments from the current benefit package is
enhanced by the fact that policy makers also have to choose
which interventions to eliminate, while they have no list in-
terventions with a ranked unfavorable (cost-) effectiveness.
Consequently they have to justify their choices to society and
may fear the public backlash that may ensue as happened in
The Netherlands concerning the IVF reimbursement policy
(29). An additional complication is that society interpreted
the social health insurance package as a “social contract”
which can not just be broken from one side (3).
Uncertainty. A third rationale for considering budget
impact in resource allocation decisions is uncertainty. Invari-
ably, there is uncertainty about the actual cost-effectiveness
of new health interventions (21). Likewise, in healthcare fi-
nance, the budget implications of expansion of the benefit
package are usually uncertain due to the fact that at the time
of launch little is known about the extent to which a drug
will be used (31). It is simply hard to estimate the size of the
user population: will a newly approved drug only be used
by those who suffer severely from a particular condition, or
will it be used as well by those who have a milder form
of the condition. Similarly, a newly launched drug may ex-
perience a broadening of indications through off-label use,
further increasing uncertainty (1). Programs may therefore
require more resources than initially budgeted.
In case reimbursement results in budget overspend, or
when large deficits loom, uncertainty is a particularly acute
problem. Uncertainty may explain why small-scale programs
are often favored over large-scale programs (21). Policy
makers have to adhere to strict budgets and therefore must
consider opportunity cost. Typically, the potential for large
deficits increases with the size of the patient population.
Hence, policy makers prefer to diversify their “investments,”
which leads to an improved handling of uncertainty regard-
ing unexpected costs, and a concomitant reduction in the risk
of overspending (37). Thus, a large budget relates to more
uncertainty and an increased need in a more precise budget
impact analyses.
Equal Opportunity. Budget impact may also play a
role in reimbursement decisions as a way to preserve equal
opportunity. Policy makers appear to allocate resources to
all those who suffer from a disease, irrespectively of the
(cost-) effectiveness of treatment. This reflects a viewpoint of
justice, that is, that people favor an equal distribution of health
resources regardless of each person’s potential to benefit from
those resources. This concern with equality works two ways:
it explains the tendency to reimburse ineffective treatments
for rare diseases or small groups, and also the tendency not to
reimburse certain treatments with high budget impact (41).
For example, there are orphan drugs with unfavorable cost per
QALY ratios, which are funded nevertheless, for example,
imiglucerase and laronidase (28). Positive decisions to fund
orphans appeal to the fact that the number of patients taking
each orphan drug is very small, therefore the budget impact
is limited (10). When all orphan diseases are taken together,
however, it is estimated that 1 in 12 people in Europe have a
rare disease. This is a fairly large group to make exceptions
for (11).
There are also instances in which costly, yet cost-
effective medical interventions would consume more re-
sources than available, if given to all eligible patients. Con-
sequently subsidized access to the intervention cannot be
guaranteed to all patients. In such circumstances, “people
[appear to] place greater importance on equity than is re-
flected by cost-effectiveness analysis” (40) and would there-
fore rather choose a less cost-effective intervention available
to all, than a very cost-effective intervention for some. Bud-
get impact analysis can then be used to assess whether it is
affordable to offer the cost-effective intervention to the entire
patient population so that equal opportunity can be guaran-
teed, or whether instead a less cost-effective intervention can
be offered to the entire population. Similarly, the rationale of
equal opportunity explains why policy makers might prefer
to preserve resources rather than spending most of it in one
go.
Policy Implications
Budget impact, we demonstrate in this article, plays a role
in drug reimbursement decisions. Dutch policy makers, we
demonstrated, do not easily admit that they consider budget
impact. In fact, policy makers are reluctant to explicitly use
budget impact as a formal criterion. This study is relevant for
policy makers who, to remain accountable by the public at
large, are confronted with a transparency requirement.
This study identified four rationales for considering the
budget impact of new drugs when a decision needs to be
made about reimbursement. The first rationale is opportunity
costs: A positive reimbursement decision for a new interven-
tion suggests the need to expand the budget for health care,
or to eliminate existing benefits to fund the new intervention.
Whichever solution one chooses, there is an opportunity cost
involved that must be considered. The second rationale re-
lates to loss aversion: people may be generally unwilling to
eliminate funding for existing benefits in favor of a new inter-
vention. Budget impact considers the felt loss by assessing
the amount of resources needed to make free. Third, bud-
get impact is considered in relation to decision uncertainty.
Fourth, people seem to favor an equal distribution of health
resources regardless of each person’s potential to benefit from
those resources, reflecting equal opportunity concerns. These
four theoretical rationales indicate budget impact’s relevance
in reimbursement decisions.
Economic consequences of positive reimbursement de-
cisions, we claim, are not sufficiently explored when only
cost-effectiveness of a new product is considered and not
its budget impact. Therefore the question is how to integrate
INTL. J. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 25:1, 2009 53
Niezen et al.
budget impact into a framework for reimbursement decisions
that is based on cost-effectiveness. Due to inflexible budgets,
risk of overspending, and political pressures, the application
of cost-effectiveness is not as simple and straightforward as
it is often advocated. For example, budget impact can trump
the cost-effectiveness argument. An unfavorable ICER for a
pharmaceutical treatment is less relevant to the policy maker
when the total budget impact is low. Conversely, an adequate
ICER can be trumped when the budget impact is high. How-
ever, what levels of budget impact and cost-effectiveness
warrant such tradeoffs? We need to identify conditions under
which a decision maker can comfortably withhold or initiate
treatment, assured of a tolerable balance between the conflict-
ing concerns. If guidance is lacking, the cost-effectiveness
criterion cannot be put to its full potential, consistency of de-
cision making is at risk, and decision makers will be vulner-
able and exposed. Therefore, we need an open discussion to
define what is acceptable or unacceptable. Such a discussion
should also shed light on the motives for considering budget
impact, because we need to acknowledge the fact that budget
impact and cost-effectiveness analyses can be assessments
based on different distributional and egalitarian rationales,
namely equal opportunity and maximizing health. If budget
impact is considered mainly because of the equal opportu-
nity rationale, it is considered fair to ensure treatment for
all patient groups, irrespective of the total health outcomes
achieved. In other words, this particular rationale for budget
impact calls into question if it is fair to allocate resources on
basis of a utilitarian principle; the equal opportunity ratio-
nale reflects that people may also strive for resource alloca-
tion fairness by some form of procedural justice that ensures
availability of treatment for all. Implications for the decision-
making framework will then go beyond the need to facilitate
application of cost-effectiveness, and require rethinking of
the basis for resource allocation decisions.
Policy makers walk a fine line between increased trans-
parency and increased efficiency; between specifying which
criteria are used and how they should be used in ex-
plicit, evidence-based assessments, and providing informa-
tion within a reasonable time-frame taking into account an
implicit “societal correction” on the technical assessments to
guarantee decisions are fair (8). Inevitably, certain decision
factors remain implicit, partly because policy makers lack
the time to reflect thoroughly on the decisions that they be-
lieve are sound; and also because they do not want to expose
themselves to criticism from the public at large. Neverthe-
less, as we and others have shown, when put to the test of
accountability, policy makers fail on account of their inade-
quate attempts to explain certain key policy decisions (20).
In this study, we have demonstrated that budget impact can
and should be openly discussed as a legitimate criterion in
the context of drug reimbursement decisions. Open discus-
sion of budget impact’s role will enhance policy makers’
accountability.
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